Posted on May 20th, 2009 by Tim Eavenson | No Comments »
Filed under: ., Labor Law |

Cat dog bed by Jon Åslund (Flickr)
Some unions in troubled companies are finding an unlikely source of salvation and partnership: private equity.
Yesterday, the Chicago Chapter of LERA invited Steve Sleigh, a member of the private equity group Yucaipa Companies, to discuss the current state of labor and capital. Sleigh admitted that private equity is most often associated with greedy takeovers, where the investor comes in to sell off profitable pieces of a foundering company, instituting layoffs and forcing concessions from unions. Increasingly, private equity is the third seat at the table of industrial relations, and disliking its interference is sometimes the only thing unions and management can agree on.
But it doesn’t have to be that way, according to Sleigh. Yucaipa occupies a unique position in the private equity arena: their partners come from backgrounds in all three camps – labor, management and finance, and their focus is on companies with unionized workforces and a solid product. The investments come in large part from multi-employer pension funds, which means the private equity group essentially becomes a conduit for unions to reinvest in the labor movement.
Like most private equity investors, Yucaipa buys companies in hopes of retooling them and selling them. But Sleigh thinks that the prevailing model of reducing payroll and benefits in order to accomplish the quick turnaround is short-sighted. Instead, Yucaipa starts its analysis by assuming that the labor costs are fixed, and then asks what else at the company can be adjusted.
In one example, a large, Midwestern cold storage company had each of its locations making individual contracts and operating decisions. Every facility had its own IT contracts, its own practices and guidelines. “They had 120 fiefdoms,” Sleigh said. By consolidating operating decisions, the company was made profitable with no loss of employment or benefits.
The secret, according to Sleigh, is in getting labor and management to focus on the good of the company together. “We often say that we’re mediators with money,” he said. By the time a company is failing, though, the two sides are often either giving up or at each other’s throats. ”My number one question is always: Who cares about the firm?” The number one answer, Sleigh said, is usually the workers – not just because they want to keep their jobs, but because longstanding workforces develop senses of community that will be lost if a company is grossly restructured or closed. By working with the unions – and having partners with history in labor organizations – Yucaipa can get early information on issues like cash flow and productivity that guide its investment decisions.
Sleigh also pointed out one of the key areas where companies get into trouble with their unionized workforces: lack of transparency. Sleigh said that, during a restructuring, they require annual presentations to both management and union representatives on the health of the company. That way, no matter what changes are needed during the turnaround, they’re not a shock to anyone. Putting unions and management on the same informational page also fosters cooperation between the parties, according to Sleigh.
Here, though, Sleigh said unions presented the biggest obstacle. Often, the union doesn’t have anyone to represent them who truly understands the financials. He said unions needed to start thinking of themselves as partners in the process.
It seems there would be some inherent conflicts in using private equity – with union pension fund backing – to restructure unionized workforces. First, what happens when a company won’t survive unless pension benefits are cut, or a defined benefit plan has to be changed to a contribution-based plan like a 401(k)? It seems like robbing Peter to pay Paul. Sleigh said that Yucaipa actively avoids those investments, and that they would ask for concessions where necessary. But drastic measures like replacing plans are much less necessary than people think.
“In 20 years of doing this,” Sleigh said, “I don’t think we’ve ever replaced a DB plan.”
Sleigh was also quick to dispel the notion that his work was less investment and more labor activism. “It’s not our business model to just be nice to unions,” he said. “It’s that being nice to unions is good for our business.”
How good? In the twenty or so years that Yucaipa has been doing this type of private investing, their average annual ROI sits above 40%. In the past few years, when overall investing has seen losses of about 35%, private equity (including Yucaipa) has lost more like 5%. That makes pension plan fiduciaries happy to invest, Sleigh said. The benefit to unionized workforces is a happy side-effect.
So what’s the next step for this blended investment model? Employee ownership. Sleigh said that he’s working on a business model that would use ESOPs as an exit strategy. So, once a company was healthy, instead of putting it up for sale on the open market, an ESOP would be put in place to turn ownership over to the employees without requiring the massive debt that’s made recent ESOP use such a disaster (think: Sam Zell’s Tribune takeover).
Posted on April 1st, 2009 by Charity Clemons | No Comments »
Filed under: ., Discrimination, HR Issues, The Financial Crisis |
On the contrary.
Amidst the gradual demise of this country’s economic infrastructure, legal and financial institutions have been faced with historic downsizing efforts. The public has been inundated with headlines foretelling salary cuts, layoffs, and disappearing pensions. As the dust begins to settle, it appears that these mass reductions are widening a gender gap that, up to now, had been slowly closing.
On March 16, Forbes magazine ran a cover article exposing claims made by Wall Street women that female employees have endured the brunt of downsizing efforts. According to the article, the financial services and insurance firms have cut approximately 260,000 jobs. An astounding 72% of these jobs belonged to women, even though women only constituted 64% of the workforce before the economic downturn.
Many of the ousted female professionals are seeking legal recourse and have recently filed charges with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Attorney Douglas Wigdor, who is featured in the Forbes article, currently represents a group of five former managers and rising young stars who claim they were victimized by the cuts. In the article, Mr. Wigdor describes the cuts as a case of “recessionary discrimination.”
Still, other women with cognizable claims against various financial institutions will not come forward. There is a concern that in doing so, they will be professionally exiled from the industry once the economy regains its footing. The Forbes article recounts a 2007 class action settlement, where female employees at Morgan Stanley were given the opportunity to opt-in:
Alice Hughes, a Morgan Stanley financial adviser in Dallas, talked with several women who declined to participate–and not because they planned to pursue separate claims. “It was just sheer fear,” she says, that even if they kept their jobs they might be excluded from benefits like getting a chunk of business when another broker left the firm. “They’re right,” says Hughes. Moreover, she claims, if they make trouble, “they will be blacklisted from working at any major firm.”
Posted on March 17th, 2009 by Tim Eavenson | No Comments »
Filed under: ., Employee Benefits, Labor Law, Politics, The Financial Crisis |
[Ed. Note: I have been looking for a way to channel my vitriol over the news that AIG wants to pay the guys who could arguably be blamed for the entire global economic meltdown $225 million in structured bonuses, and I'm hoping to do it through this post. That said, don't fault me if I start yelling. ]
I love David Greising. The Chicago Tribune and NPR business contributor seems to understand everything business, especially the stuff I don’t. This morning, he took on AIG’s bailout apologist CEO, Edward Liddy, for going soft on derivatives execs after canning 6000 Allstate employees a few years ago, employment contracts be damned.
Why, Greising asks, after pushing Allstate into a handful of class action lawsuits (two by the EEOC, even – that takes work) because he ignored the axed employees’ contracts, has the man brought in by the Bush Administration to clean up AIG dropped the broom?
Given his own history, Liddy’s explanation that his “hands are tied” because of the derivative department’s executive agreements is sad. Can you imagine the media tsunami that would follow a class-action lawsuit on behalf of AIG derivatives executives for their bonuses? It’s not even their salaries, it’s their #%*$@* bonuses! … [cough] sorry.
Honestly, it’s like Wall Street and K Street are having a “who can sound more hollow” contest.
Greising also points out that other ailing corporations, including Motorola and Continental Airlines, have worked out deals with their executives for pay cuts, bonus paybacks and the like.
And then there’s the big wrench in Liddy’s explanation – the United Auto Workers. They, too, had a contract. A few, actually. But nobody – not the government, the union or the automakers asking for tax money ever questioned whether it could be renegotiated.
And that’s as it should be.
So what’s different about AIG? How is it that, in the face of a furious public, following one of the biggest collective renegotiations in history, and with a proven executioner at the helm, this company can’t get out of paying millions in bonuses?
Is there a double standard among contracts for workers and contracts for executives? Probably. But Greising’s article proves that that can’t answer the whole question. Honestly, I think the real problem here is a denial of workplace realities.
When the auto industry was getting bailed out, one of the biggest arguments against giving them the money was that it would create a false sense of stability. The employees and executives of the Big 3 needed to understand the dire straits they were in, and government infusions would keep that from happening.
The same is clearly true at AIG. Employees and executives alike simply don’t understand how close to the edge they are. They want to pay bonuses to “retain talent”? Talent?
The department created confusing securitized investments that didn’t work. Now it’s months away from being wound down, and they’re still paying to retain talent? This is a group of people who need to feel their livelihoods are in jeopardy. That’s why the UAW renegotiated their deals. That’s why Motorola execs adjusted theirs, too.
Employment contracts are only as good as the companies that agree to them. Perhaps if AIG were suddenly small enough to fail (potentially, at least), its employees would find it in their hearts to discuss their compensation structures.