Posted on December 9th, 2008 by Tim Eavenson | No Comments »
Filed under: Discrimination, HR Issues | 
On Monday the Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., a case which should settle a long-held debate over how so-called “mixed motive” claims are handled.
A little background: Congress passed a civil rights bill in 1991, conveniently titled “The Civil Rights Act of 1991,” which overturned some of the Supreme Court’s decisions relating to the way lawsuits are brought under Title VII of the earlier Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII is the main anti-discrimination law, protecting people because of color, race, gender, national origin or religion.
The problem this caused, which the Court will probably address in Gross, is that lower courts have limited the CRA’91 to Title VII, using the old rules for other anti-discrimination laws, like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), where the suits allege employers had “mixed motives” or partially legal and partially discriminatory reasons for firing the plaintiff/employee.
In other words, if you bring a lawsuit under Title VII, and you allege that your employer had mixed motives for firing you, you have to prove it differently than if you bring it under the ADA or ADEA. Seems like a very small thing outside of employment law circles, but since most cases are mixed motive, the Supreme Court’s decision could have very real, long-lasting effects.
Hat Tip: Workplace Prof Blog
More on Gross v. FBL @ Ross Runkel’s Law Memo
Posted on March 25th, 2008 by Tim Eavenson | No Comments »
Filed under: Uncategorized |
Clearly a statement about
the overuse of acronyms, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a case between the
American Association of Retired Persons and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
The AARP petitioned after the 3th Circuit upheld a Commission rule that employers can offer reduced healthcare to older workers and retirees once they are Medicare-eligible, without violating the ADEA. The Supremes denied the petition Monday.
For it’s part, the AARP was none too pleased. AARP Legislative Policy Director David Certner, via On the Hill:
Beyond blatant age discrimination, the new policy is an ineffective Band-aid for the bigger issue facing American employers and workers: the skyrocketing cost of health care,” Certner says. “By allowing employers to reduce or even eliminate health benefits for retirees when they reach age 65, this rule essentially shifts the costs of all retiree health care on to the backs of older retirees.
“Blatant age discrimination” against retirees? You know who else has trouble finding affordable healthcare? Everyone who is still working. You knew when the boomers got in there they’d start fighting each other. Here’s my legal analysis: not letting employers adjust healthcare rates for the Medicare-eligible makes as much sense as me suing Hooters for discrimination when it rejected my application as a waitress. I mean if. If it rejected my hypothetical application.
Whatever, you get it. Just because something’s not equal doesn’t mean it’s not fair. Incidentally, the rule was promulgated at the insistance of labor groups and other associations, who feared that employers would reduce retiree health benefits across the board if they couldn’t take Medicare eligibility into account.
Still, it’s a funny, fickle Court they’re running out east. Six months ago, it seemed you couldn’t get into the place if you were under 55.
Posted on December 5th, 2007 by Tim Eavenson | No Comments »
Filed under: Uncategorized |
The Supreme Court took up the issue of “me too” evidence in discrimination claims on Monday, hearing arguments in
Mendelsohn v. Sprint. The case hinges on whether or not testimony of other employees who were allegedly discriminated against (“me too” evidence) is admissible as circumstantial evidence of another employee’s alleged discrimination. Did that make sense?
It’s like this. You sue your employer. I say “hey, that happened to me, too” (thus the catchy name) usually under a different supervisor. I testify at your trial as to my events, thus providing “evidence” that your discrimination happened.
As always, SCOTUSblog (and now the awesome SCOTUSwiki – my new favorite website) has the best coverage. Not to be outdone the New York Times has a synopsis of the orals, noting that the Roberts Court seemed to be more conservative than Bush’s EEOC, which would like to allow “me too” information when it can jive with the relevance and nonprejudicial rules of evidence.
Most of the Court seemed to think that letting in “me too” evidence would necessitate “minitrials” within trials to determine whether or not the information was accurate, and therefore relevant. From Paul Cane’s Argument for Sprint:
Had the “me, too” evidence been admitted, then we would have had to respond with what might be called “not you, either” evidence. And then the plaintiff would have made a rebuttal to that showing, and we would have had trials within a trial on whether these couple of persons that plaintiff identified as potential bad actors were, in fact, bad actors…
I think they should disallow the use of the evidence until someone comes up with descriptions that don’t make us sound like we’re fighting over a Tonka truck.
Justice Souter said the evidence would be highly prejudicial, but could be probative too. After all, if your supervisor is discriminating and mine is discriminating, isn’t that a sign of something? Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia didn’t think so. Turns out, this is a really good oral transcript to read if you’re a 2L stuck in evidence, because it goes to show you can be a Supreme Court Justice and still not know what Rule 403 really covers.
And then Justice Breyer sort of went off the deep end a little and said that “me too” evidence couldn’t be allowed in or “[w]e’ll have trials that last a thousand years…”
A thousand years. Hmm. So, like longer than the time between now and the Magna Charta. Maybe the Court should start taking on more mandatory retirement cases…
Anyway, as posted
here, this decision could have pretty sweeping effects on future pattern and practice cases. It’s unlikely this is an issue the Court will balk on (unlike, say,
401(k) recovery for individual claimants).
